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Pierce Hawthorne: We all know what we’re really thinking. If, and I mean ‘if ’ 
the culprit is among us, statistically speaking it’s Troy.
— Community, Cooperative Calligraphy
I. Setting up a conflict 
Let's start with an obvious point: we form beliefs about other people all the time. I believe 
that at a busy intersection no less than three drivers will turn left when the light turns red. 
Why? Because I see it happen all the time. On similar grounds I believe that when it rains 
half  of  my students won't  show up for class.  Why? Because in my experience no one in 
Southern California, and I include myself in this generalization, knows how to deal with rain. 
We often don't think twice about forming beliefs on the basis of these sorts of statistical 
regularities or stereotypes. But maybe we should.
Consider, for example, whether I should believe that a black man standing outside of a 
restaurant is a valet. What if it's the case that every valet I have interacted with outside of 
this restaurant has been black? What if I'm in a rush and I just need to get my car and I 
know that 90% of valets at this restaurant are black? Although this seems like a classic case 
of  racial  profiling,  the  evidence  seems  really  strong.  As  Barack  Obama has  noted  in  an 
interview with People magazine, “There’s no black male [his] age, who’s a professional, who 
hasn’t come out of a restaurant and is waiting for their car and somebody didn’t hand them 
their car keys.” I might get it wrong, but given the probabilities, I’m also very likely to get it 
right.  But  here’s  the  challenge:  unjust  social  structures  of  our  world  gerrymander  the 
regularities and the evidence an individual is exposed to in ways that reinforce racist and 
sexist  beliefs  (see  Munton  2017  and  Basu  2018).  What  if  it  is  the  case  that  because  of 
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historical patterns of discrimination the vast majority of valets working at this restaurant are 
black? In such a context, if I mistake Barack Obama for a valet, have I done anything wrong?
In one sense, yes. My belief was inaccurate. Further, my belief was an instance of racial 
profiling, and racial profiling is generally considered to be morally problematic. However, in 
another sense, in believing as I did I was at least aiming at having an accurate belief. To 
introduce a technical term, it was epistemically rational for me to believe what I did. Suppose, 
for example, that you check the weather forecast and see that there’s a 90% chance of rain 
tomorrow. Given that 90% chance, you should believe that it will rain tomorrow. Further, it 
is appropriate to criticize you for being epistemically irrational were you to not believe it’ll rain 
tomorrow, e.g., if you started to plan a picnic. By disregarding the likelihood of rain, you are 
doing  something  epistemically  wrong.  It  is  epistemically  irrational  and  irresponsible  to 
ignore evidence that bears on the question of what to believe. 
If  we  return  to  the  racial  profiling  case,  however,  we  now  find  ourselves  in  the 
following bind. Believing in accordance with the evidence—the high likelihood that a black 
man standing outside the restaurant is a valet—may lead you to hold a belief that is morally 
problematic. After all, assuming that a black man is a valet is a paradigmatic example of a 
racist belief, and racist beliefs are morally impermissible. The world we live in is pretty racist, 
and so it shouldn’t be surprising if the world presents us with a lot of evidence for pretty 
racist beliefs. Thus, the stage is now set for the conflict between accuracy and fairness that is 
the subject of this chapter. Any black male standing outside a restaurant who is mistaken for 
a valet seems to have the legitimate complaint, no matter how much evidence you had for 
your belief, that it is unfair that you assume that they must be a valet. But now we must ask, 
why is it unfair?
It’s at least partly unfair for reasons that Lawrence Blum has noted. Blum says, “being 
seen as an individual is an important form of acknowledgment of persons, failure of such 
acknowledgement is a moral fault and constitutes a bad of all stereotyping” (2004, p. 282, see 
also Lippert-Rasmussen 2011). Similarly, it’s also unfair because we wish to be related to as we 
are, not as we are expected to be on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, class, etc. 
When someone forms beliefs about us in the same way we form beliefs about planets—that 
is, as objects to be observed and predicted—they fail to relate to us as persons (see Basu 
2019). If you’ve ever been mistaken for waitstaﬀ or “the help” because, as Pusha T says, your 
melanin’s got a tint, you recognize that feeling of unfairness. If anyone’s ever thought that 
you’re not interested in science because you're a woman or made you feel  self-conscious 
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about being sad and wanting to cry because you’re a man (“men don’t cry”), you know what it 
feels like to have assumptions made about you. Sometimes they’re innocuous or trivial and 
you don’t feel hurt or restricted by them, but often they’re not so trivial. Sometimes they 
really  hurt.  Although it  is  notoriously  tricky to pin down exactly  what  is  meant by this 
requirement to treat others as individuals and what precisely it is that makes stereotyping 
morally  wrong (for  more see  Beeghly  2015  and 2018),  we recognize  this  feeling of  being 
wronged,  of  being reduced,  of  being treated as an object,  when we are stereotyped.  It’s, 
simply put, not fair.
This  unfairness  of  believing  something  of  another  person  simply  on  the  basis  of 
statistical evidence is also recognized by our judicial system. You cannot convict someone 
solely on the basis of statistical evidence no matter how strong that statistical evidence. Within 
legal  scholarship this is  known as the problem of naked statistical  evidence (see Schauer 
2006, Enoch et al. 2012, and Buchak 2014). The common example goes as follows: while you 
were driving a bus sideswiped your car. In your town there are only two bus companies: the 
Blue Bus Company and the Green Bus Company. You want compensation for the damages, 
so you decide to sue the company operating the bus that sideswiped your car. Here’s the 
problem, though. It was late at night and you couldn’t accurately identify the color of the 
bus. But, you also know that 80% of the buses in the city are blue buses operated by the Blue 
Bus Company, whereas the other 20% are green and operated by the Green Bus Company. 
Given the balance of the probabilities, you can be fairly confident that you were sideswiped 
by a blue bus. 
In a civil court you only need to demonstrate a preponderance of evidence. That is, 
that it is more likely than not that you were hit by a blue bus. The good news is that the 
statistics are on your side! It is, after all, 80% likely that you were hit by a blue bus and 80% 
is  greater  than  50%.  The  bad  news,  however,  is  that  this  merely  statistical  evidence  is 
inadmissible in the courtroom. If there had been an eyewitness who could testify that they 
saw a blue bus sideswipe your car, then you’d stand a much better chance at winning your 
case even if that eyewitness testimony was less reliable than the mere statistical evidence. Why? Again, 
the answer seems to return to these considerations of fairness. It would be unfair to convict 
the Blue Bus Company just because it’s statistically likely that if a car is sideswiped by a bus 
it would be sideswiped by one of their buses. It is unfair to hand your keys to a black man 
assuming that he’s a valet just because it’s statistically likely that he’s a valet.
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Although you can’t find the Blue Bus Company guilty for sideswiping your car, perhaps 
you still have enough evidence to believe that it was a blue bus that sideswiped your car. It 
might be unfair to the Blue Bus Company, but that’s where the preponderance of evidence 
lies. Similarly, the world isn’t a fair or just place; the world has been shaped by racism and 
other discriminatory practices. Perhaps there’s some truth to the stereotypes we hold and so 
if we want to do what’s epistemically right, i.e., believe in accordance with the evidence, we just 
have to make this tradeoﬀ with moral considerations like fairness. And this brings us right 
back to the conflict of this chapter: in the interests of accuracy, must we give up on fairness 
or in the interests of fairness must we give up on accuracy? 
To  answer  these  questions  concerning  the  seeming  conflict  between  accuracy  and 
fairness, we first need to get clear on what is even meant by the claim that you should believe 
in accordance with the evidence. A common person to turn to when it comes to explicating 
the duty to believe responsibly is W. K. Cliﬀord. Cliﬀord (1877) asks us to consider an old-
timey ship owner whose ship is about to ferry families to their new home. The ship owner 
knows that the ship is old, it has a few faults and it has been in need of a number of repairs. 
He's thought to himself that he should have the ship overhauled and refitted, but that would 
be a costly venture. As he watches the ship leave the dock, he pushes his doubts aside by 
reminding himself that she’s still  a hardy ship and she’s safely made and returned from a 
number of journeys. So, perhaps he has no reason to be worried that this time she might not 
safely come home. I'll leave the last bit of the example in Cliﬀord’s own words:
In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel 
was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light 
heart, and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles in their strange new 
home that was to be; and he got his insurance-money when she went down in 
mid-ocean and told no tales. (p. 1)
Now, is the ship owner guilty of the deaths of the passengers on his ship? He did, after all, 
sincerely believe that his ship was seaworthy. Nonetheless, Cliﬀord argues, the ship owner’s 
sincerity means absolutely nothing because he had no right to believe on the basis of the 
evidence  he  had (for  more  cases  like  this,  see  Siegel,  this  volume).  Instead of  gathering 
evidence about the seaworthiness of his ship he instead came to his belief by stifling his 
doubts. Furthermore, even if his luck (and the luck of the passengers) had been diﬀerent and 
the ship had safely made the journey, his guilt would not be diminished one bit. Whether the 
belief turned out to be true or false has no bearing on whether the ship owner had a right to 
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believe on the evidence that was before him. As Cliﬀord famously remarks,  “it  is  wrong 
always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insuﬃcient evidence.”
An important part, then, of having epistemically rational beliefs is ensuring that your 
beliefs are held on the basis of suﬃcient evidence. It seems pretty intuitive to say that you 
should believe in accordance with the evidence, and we seem to hold people to this standard 
all the time. For example, suppose someone were to insist that there has been no foreign 
interference in our elections. We wouldn’t just take their word for it. What we’d want to 
know is what reasons they have for thinking that, i.e., what evidence they are basing their 
beliefs upon. But, to now practice some of the pedantry well-known to philosophy: what is 
evidence? Or to borrow a popular meme, we can present the question as follows.
 
Fig 1.
This  is  a  diﬃcult  question to answer,  but for  our purposes we can appeal  to a  standard 
intuitive  conception  of  evidence  and  how it  relates  to  the  epistemic  rationality  of  belief. 
Ordinarily when we think of evidence we think of examples from crime procedurals, e.g., gun 
residue, fingerprints, DNA from a strand of hair. These examples of evidence are physical 
objects we can put in a bag, label as evidence, send to a lab, and present in front of a judge or 
jury. But that’s not all that evidence is. What I hear, see, and smell can be evidence that bears 
on  a  question  under  investigation.  This  question  of  how  to  understand  the  nature  of 
evidence is a big one (see Kelly 2016 for a survey of the topic), but in what follows we will 
work with the following intuitive  gloss:  evidence for  a  question under  investigation is  a 
reliable sign, symptom, or mark for information relevant to the question under investigation. 
For example, smoke is a reliable sign of fire and as such it is evidence of fire. Similarly, my 
dog’s barking is evidence of someone at the door, a distinctive whistle from the kettle is 
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evidence that the water has boiled, and the sight of rain outside my window is evidence that 
it is raining outside. Now we can fill out our meme as follows.
 
Fig 2.
Returning to our opening example involving racial profiling, the question we must ask is 
whether you or I have suﬃcient evidence upon which to believe that the black man standing 
outside the restaurant is a valet. We’ve already noted that the belief is morally problematic 
because it seems unfair. Nonetheless, it also seems like it’s the belief you ought to have given 
the evidence.  Notice that  although Cliﬀord states  it  as  a  moral  imperative to believe in 
accordance with the evidence, moral considerations—such as whether the belief would be a 
racist belief—play no role in determining whether a belief is epistemically rational or not. 
Epistemic rationality is just a matter of the evidence you have and whether that evidence 
provides adequate justification for your beliefs. As Ben Shapiro might say, the facts don’t care 
about your feelings. Translating this into our, and Cliﬀord’s, vocabulary, we might say that the 
evidence, or the reasons for believing, don’t care about your feelings.
Now if that’s the case: the question can be put like this. When we have these conflicts 
between fairness considerations and, on the other hand, what you should believe based on 
your evidence, what should you do? 
Broadly speaking,  the options you have available for answering this  question range 
from either just accepting that this is an irresolvable dilemma to saying that there’s no fact of 
the matter about what you should do and you should just choose fairness or accuracy. These 
options can be mapped as follows.
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Fig 3.
Going forward, I’ll begin by canvassing the various options—starting at the extremes with 
The Dilemmist vs. The Pluralist—in an attempt to present each camp warts and all so the 
reader can decide for themselves what they find most convincing. But I also think there is a 
right  answer.  My  preferred  answer,  moral  encroachment,  requires  a  shift  in  how  we 
understand the demands of fairness and accuracy. According to moral encroachment, there is 
no dilemma here, but there is a fact of the matter about what you ought to do. That sounds 
odd, but I’ll try to show it’s the most promising answer to this apparent conflict between 
fairness and accuracy.
!  7
2. The Dilemmist vs. the Pluralist 
Dilemmas are familiar from our everyday lives. You want a decadent brownie but you also 
want to eat healthy. You can’t do both. You promised a friend you’d meet them for lunch, but 
then another friend has a crisis just before lunchtime. You either keep your promise to one 
friend or break the promise to go support your other friend. You love both your children 
equally but because Nazis are evil, they’re threatening to kill both your children unless you 
choose one, and only one, for them to kill. These examples escalate quickly, but you get the 
point.
The  possibility  of  genuine  normative  dilemmas  is  most  clearly  seen  when  both 
obligations are of the same normative kind, e.g., two moral demands. To illustrate this, let’s 
consider Ginny. Ginny has promised Fred she’d see the new Marvel movie with him and only 
him (A), but she also promised George that she’d see the new DC movie with him and only 
him (B). Imagine that Ginny lives in a town with only one movie theater and because of her 
busy schedule she has been putting oﬀ her obligations until tonight, the last night that both 
movies are playing. Unfortunately, she can only either keep her promise to Fred and do A, or 
she can keep her promise to George and do B. There is no way for her to do both. Ginny 
finds herself torn between two incompatible options—A and B—and asks “What ought I do? 
A or B?” Let us now imagine that she shouts out this question to the universe and while she’s 
shouting, a proponent of The Dilemmist position happens to be walking by. Noting Ginny’s 
dilemma they helpfully answer, “Well, you ought to do A, and you ought to do B. Basically, 
you’re just stuck between a rock and a hard place.” We could reasonably expect Ginny to 
reply reminding this stranger oﬀering advice that she can’t do both, and she wants to know 
which she ought to do. If they were again to simply reply that she ought do A, and she ought 
do B, that is no help.
Now, why should we think that there are genuine dilemmas of this sort? Partly, we 
can follow a line presented by Bernard Williams (1965): in the case of moral dilemmas you 
might think that whatever Ginny does, she’ll feel regret at not having done the other. If she 
breaks her promise to George and goes to the movies with Fred, she’ll feel the need to make 
it up to George. Seeing that both incompatible acts are required does justice to why we 
would feel this regret. This case of promising involves two moral obligations, but what about 
when moral and epistemic obligations, such as fairness and accuracy, seem to collide? 
A classic defender of this dilemmist position is Tamar Gendler. She introduces the 
following case that mirrors the conflicts we’ve been discussing so far, and argues that the 
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characters  in  the  case  (taken  from John  Hope  Franklin’s  autobiography)  simply  face  an 
irresolvable dilemma. 
Social Club. Agnes and Esther are members of a swanky D.C. social club with a 
strict dress code of tuxedos for both male guests and staﬀ members, and dresses 
for female guests and staﬀ members. They are about to go on their evening walk 
so they head towards the coat check to collect their coats. As they approach the 
coat  check,  Agnes  looks  around  for  a  staﬀ  member.  All  of  the  club’s  staﬀ 
members are black, whereas only a small number of the club members are black. 
As Agnes looks around she notices a well-dressed black man standing oﬀ to the 
side and tells Esther, “There’s a staﬀ member. We can give our coat check ticket 
to him.” (see Gendler 2011 for the original case)
Gendler, in a familiar refrain, argues that given that we live in a society structured by racial 
categories,  we simply face a  tragic  irresolvable  dilemma.  We must  either  (a)  lose  out  on 
knowledge  and pay  the  epistemic  cost  of  failing  to  attend to  certain  sorts  of  statistical 
information  about  cultural  categories  (i.e.,  encoding  the  information  that  a  minuscule 
fraction of club members are black whereas all the staﬀ members are black) or (b) we must 
actively believe against the evidence and work at regulating the inevitable implicit biases 
which that information gives us. In other words, we must choose between doing what we 
epistemically ought (attend and respond to the background statistical information about the 
race of the staﬀ  members)  and what we morally ought (not use someone’s  race to make 
assumptions about them, such as that they are staﬀ). This, she argues, places us in a tragic 
irresolvable  dilemma.  We  cannot  simultaneously  fulfill  both  our  moral  and  epistemic 
obligations, and there is no way to resolve this conflict. Both options have major downsides.
A challenge for interpreting these cases of normative conflict as genuine dilemmas is 
that it can undermine movements against racism and implicit bias. As Jennifer Saul (2018) 
argues, if we were to suggest that opposition to racism (what is morally required) leads one 
into (epistemic)  irrationality, then the consequence is that the person committed to anti-
racism will be irrational. As Saul (2018, pp. 238-9) goes on to note,
Although it is clearly not Gendler’s intent, this fits exceptionally well with the 
right-wing narratives of politically correct thought-police attempting to prevent 
people from facing up to diﬃcult truths; and of the over-emotional left, which 
really needs to be corrected by the sound common sense of the right. Anything 
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that props up these narratives runs the risk of working against the cause of social 
justice. 
However,  there  may  be  ways  to  acknowledge  that  moral  and  epistemic  obligations  can 
conflict without suggesting that adopting the moral option means you’re being irrational. 
One such way, pluralism, starts from the observation that obligations of all diﬀerent sorts are 
in conflict all the time. Maybe, then, there’s nothing special about moral-epistemic conflicts. 
According to pluralism there is a plurality of oughts and from the perspective of each ought 
you simply ought do what it prescribes. If we return to the flowchart from Fig. 3, the pluralist 
says that the conflict is resolvable, meaning that it’s not the case that any one consideration 
(always, or even ever) takes priority over another, and there’s just no fact of the matter about 
what you should do in these cases of conflict.
For example, consider the Knights Who Say Ni from Monty Python and the Holy Grail. 
To say that the Knights Who Say Ni have some weird norms would be an understatement. 
For those unfamiliar with this important cultural reference, one of the standards governing 
Knights Who Say Ni is to shout “Ni!” until their demands are met, i.e., a gift of shrubbery. As 
a result, that you are a Knight Who Says Ni generates a reason for you to shout “Ni!” until 
you are gifted shrubbery. Despite the silliness of the example, we recognize that a lot of 
prescriptive norms are like this. Perhaps the rules of etiquette only generate reasons for you
—a reason to take oﬀ your hat when indoors, a reason to not pick your nose at the dinner 
table, etc.—if you care about the rules of etiquette. Perhaps these standards of fairness and 
accuracy are in the same boat.
A consequence of this style of pluralism is that if any standard can generate reasons 
for you, then we will have an infinite number of reasons generated by an infinite number of 
standards and we will constantly be pulled in every direction. Although this initially sounds 
bad, it does seem to reflect how we feel a lot of the time. Consider, for example, the familiar 
saying that you can either have it cheap, fast, or good: you can only pick two! Alternatively, 
you can either be well-rested, have good grades, or a social life, but not all three.
A challenge for the pluralist is that they need to explain why our intuitions in cases 
involving a small good in one domain at the expense of a large cost in another domain seem 
to suggest that there is something you all things considered ought to do. These cases are referred 
to as the argument from notable-nominal comparisons (see Chang 1997, Scanlon 1998, Parfit 2011). 
For example, if you are walking by a lake and see a drowning child you could either save the 
child or you could not. From the perspective of self-interest, perhaps you shouldn’t save the 
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child—after all, you would get your clothes wet and from the perspective of self-interest you 
prefer having dry clothes. From the perspective of morality, you should rescue the drowning 
child. The pluralist in this case must simply say that what you morally ought do is rescue the 
child,  but  self-interestedly  you  ought  not  rescue  the  child.  This  seems  like  the  wrong 
conclusion. What we want to say in this case is that you just ought to do what you morally 
ought do. Thus, we are pushed towards a diﬀerent answer: the conflict is resolvable, so there 
must be some consideration that takes priority over the other considerations. So, let us now 
turn to those three options.
3. Moral Priority, Epistemic Priority, and the All Things Considered 
or Just Plain Ought
To get the intuitive grasp on the idea that there is an all things considered ought or just plain 
ought  that can tell  us what we should do when we’re in a dilemma or we feel  conflicted 
between competing options:  consider  the ought we deploy when we oﬀer  advice to one 
another, it is the kind of ought that would issue from a wise guru who has weighed all the 
relevant considerations. For example, in the movie adaptation of The Notebook, Noah (played 
by Ryan Gosling) asks Allie (played by Rachel McAdams) what she really wants. He doesn’t 
want to know what it is that everyone wants, what she thinks he wants or what her parents want. 
Those wants are all relative-wants, they are wants relative to other people. Noah wants to 
know what Allie just plain wants. This example suggests that we can make sense of an idea of 
an all things considered ought, or just plain ought, and maybe determining what we ought all 
things considered do will help us in these cases of normative conflicts between fairness on the 
one hand and accuracy on the other.
Starting with the all things considered ought, one consideration in favor of such an 
account is that it oﬀers us a unified and comprehensive answer. That is, the other oughts, 
such as the moral ought (as captured by considerations of fairness) and the epistemic ought 
(as captured by considerations of accuracy), are partial or incomplete collections of all the 
relevant  considerations.  The  all  things  considered  ought,  as  its  name  suggests,  is 
comprehensive; it is based on all the considerations that weigh either in favor or against. We 
can  contrast  this  with  something  like  the  moral  priority  or  the  epistemic  priority  view. 
According to those views, when Agnes (the swanky club member looking to drop oﬀ  her 
coat) is deciding what to do or what to believe, either the moral considerations are more 
weighty and take priority over the epistemic considerations (moral priority, which means she 
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should ignore the statistical fact that black people are almost entirely employees of the club, 
rather than members) or the opposite (epistemic priority, which means she should just go 
with the statistics and ignore the potential harms for black club members like John Hope 
Franklin when others assume that they’re employees). A challenge for going either of these 
two routes would be explaining why one takes priority over the other. Furthermore, this 
challenge is particularly diﬃcult for anyone who wants to defend epistemic priority, i.e., that 
considerations of accuracy take priority over considerations of fairness.
To briefly expand on this  challenge,  it  is  simply not clear whether the epistemic 
ought  is  powerful  enough  to  take  priority  over  other  considerations.  According  to  an 
influential  argument  from Mark  Nelson  (2010),  we  have  no  positive  epistemic  duties  to 
believe: that is, we are never required to believe anything. Evidence might give us a reason to 
believe something, but to say that it follows that I have a duty to believe everything for 
which I have evidence leads to a conclusion we ought reject: that I am required to believe an 
infinite number of things. For example, if you have evidence that supports believing p and 
you are required to believe p, then following simple rules of logic you now also have evidence 
that supports believe p or q and you’re similarly required to believe p or q, you also now have 
evidence that supports believing p or q or r, etc. There are now infinitely many beliefs we are 
required to believe.
Returning  to  the  all  things  considered  view,  we  can  instead  envision  some third 
perspective from which to adjudicate these competing demands and values. A benefit of the 
all things considered account is that it oﬀers a kind of comprehensive value (see Chang 2003). 
Further, this more comprehensive value comes with a kind of special authority that the all 
things  considered  ought  has  that  the  other  oughts  and  considerations  don’t.  For  every 
consideration, whether it is morality, epistemic rationality, etiquette, prudence, or whatever, 
we can always ask, “Why should I be moral?”, “Why should I take my hat oﬀ when I enter a 
church?”,  “Why  should  I  care  about  self-interest?”,  etc.  The  reason  we  can  ask  these 
questions  of  these  oughts  and  considerations  is  because  we  are  implicitly  granting  the 
authority of a more comprehensive ought, of a third perspective from which to answer these 
should questions.
However you wish to cash out this idea of an all things considered ought, there are 
some reasons for skepticism. Here I will canvass just two such reasons. First, there might be 
no common scale for weighing these considerations—moral, epistemic, aesthetic, legal, etc. 
That is, there is no further normative perspective from which we can both ask and answer 
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the question of how these reasons should be combined. To see why one might doubt that 
there is a common scale for weighing moral and epistemic considerations together, consider 
the  following  example:  trying  to  compare  diﬀerent  colleges  to  go  to.  There  are  many 
dimensions along which we can compare various colleges, e.g., average class size, professor to 
student ratio, sports teams, Greek life, or the best damn band in the land. But, how do we 
determine which college is all things considered the best? Similarly, imagine trying to give an all-
things-considered  judgment  about  who  is  the  all-things-considered  best  superhero  (it’s 
Captain America btw, but I’m willing to hear arguments in favor of Thor). If we could answer 
that question, why do such arguments get so heated? If there were an answer, there wouldn’t 
be reasonable disagreement. Maybe just as we can’t make sense of the best all things considered 
college or superhero, we similarly can’t make sense of the all things considered ought.
Second, and relatedly, you might worry that the all things considered or just plain 
ought doesn’t make sense because it requires there to be some standard that is the most 
normatively important standard. However, either way you cash out this idea is incoherent. 
David Copp (1997) argues that whatever way we try to explain the authority that this most 
normatively important standard has will force us to embrace a contradiction. For example, 
consider the standard S. Let us suppose that S is the most normatively important standpoint. 
But,  if  S  is  the  most  normatively  important  standpoint,  then  there  must  be  some more 
authoritative standard, A, that tells us that S is the most normatively important standpoint. 
The challenge we now face is answering whether A is identical to S. If A is identical to S, then 
A cannot  play  the  role  of  the  more  important  normative  standard  that  establishes  the 
normative  supremacy  of  S.  That  kind  of  self-endorsement  is  characteristic  of  all  the 
normative standards we’ve been considering and as such it is unimpressive, e.g., morality tells 
you to listen to morality and self-interest tells you to listen to self-interest. So, A cannot be 
identical to S. But, were A to be a standard other than S, that is similarly unimpressive. What 
we want to know is whether S is the most normatively important standard full stop. But if A is 
more authoritative, then S is not the most important standard. So, Copp concludes, there is 
no coherent way to cash out the idea that there is a normatively most important standard 
that is the standard of what we ought, all things considered, do.
To  see  this  in  play  in  Gendler’s  original  example  involving  John  Hope  Franklin, 
suppose  you  think  that  morality  is  the  normatively  important  standpoint.  From that  it 
follows  that  considerations  of  fairness  take  priority  over  considerations  of  accuracy. 
However,  what  makes  morality  the  most  normatively  important  standpoint?  The answer 
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can’t  be  morality  itself,  because  that’s  an  unimpressive  kind  of  self-endorsement 
characteristic of all normative standards. So, perhaps there’s some more authoritative standard 
than morality, and that more authoritative standard, The Authority, tells us that morality is 
the most normatively important standard. But, now it turns out that morality isn’t the most 
normatively  important standard,  it’s  The Authority.  Also,  what makes The Authority  the 
most normatively important standard—some other authority, The Meta-Authority?
4. Moral Encroachment
As I noted earlier, I don’t personally find any of the previous options fully convincing. What 
leads those options astray, I believe, is the very framing of the scenarios under consideration 
as ones involving a conflict between competing norms. Rather, what I believe the valet case and 
the John Hope Franklin case present us with is just a morally fraught example of a very 
common occurrence: a high-stakes situation. There are many situations in which we would 
characterize what we should believe or what we should do as being high stakes. For example, 
consider the following classic example. Suppose you have an important mortgage payment 
due on Monday. As a millennial,  the idea of a mortgage payment sounds like a luxurious 
expense I’ll never have the opportunity to experience, so to update the luxurious expense 
example to one that I expect more readers will be able to relate to: imagine that you have a 
meal-kit  delivery  subscription  that  automatically  withdraws  a  certain  amount  from your 
bank account every Monday. 
Now, let’s say that it’s Friday afternoon, you’ve just been paid, but for some reason 
you don’t have direct deposit set up. You have two options: you can either try to go to the 
bank on your way home on Friday or hope that the bank is open on Saturday and find some 
time to go then. Alternatively, you can deposit your check through the mobile-banking app 
on your phone. If you do the former, the money will be in your account right away (either on 
Friday or on Saturday), if you do the latter you know the check probably won’t clear until 
Tuesday. Now imagine a low-stakes case: you’ve got more than enough money in your bank 
account so you don’t risk overdraft fees if you don’t deposit your paycheck before Monday. 
As you and your wife are on the bus headed home you’re about the pass the bank and have to 
make a decision about whether to request the stop or stay on the bus to get home earlier. It’s 
been a long day and since you’re in no rush to deposit your paycheck, you causally ask your 
wife, “Hey, do you know if the bank is open on Saturday?” She tells you that she thinks she’s 
been by the bank before on a Saturday and it was open. 
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Now contrast  that  case  with  a  high-stakes  case.  You  will  face  overdraft  fees  on 
Monday if the check is not deposited before Monday. If you decide not to stop in at the bank 
on Friday and you decide to believe that your wife knows that bank will be open on Saturday 
and it turns out it’s not open…bad news bears. Here’s the thing, though: in both the low-
stakes case and the high-stakes case,  your evidential  situation is  the exact same: you are 
relying  upon  the  testimony  of  your  wife.  If  all  that  matters  to  epistemic  rationality  is 
believing on the basis of your evidence, well, you have the same evidence in both cases so 
what you should believe in both cases should be identical. Our intuitions, however, diﬀer. In 
the low-stakes case it seems that your wife’s testimony is suﬃcient evidence to be justified in 
believing that the bank will be open on Saturday, but in the high stakes case that very same 
evidence no longer seems suﬃcient. After all, if she’s wrong then you risk overdraft fees.
These sorts of examples have been used to argue for pragmatic encroachment, the idea 
that practical features of our situation can make a diﬀerence to (or “encroach” upon) whether 
we’re in a position to know or whether we’re in a position to believe on the basis of the 
evidence we have available to us (Fantl  and McGrath 2002 and 2009;  Stanley 2005;  and 
Schroeder 2012). However, recall Cliﬀord’s claim that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
anyone, to believe anything upon insuﬃcient evidence.” What the pragmatic encroachers 
add to this observation from Cliﬀord is that what counts as suﬃcient or insuﬃcient evidence 
can vary according to the practical stakes of the belief.
If we return now to the cases of the mistaken valet and John Hope Franklin, I believe 
these cases are similar  to the cases that motivate pragmatic encroachment (and I’m not 
alone, see also Code 1987, Pace 2011, Moss 2018a and 2018b, Basu and Schroeder 2019, Fritz 
2018, Bolinger 2018, Basu Forthcoming). The moral risks present in the cases, i.e., the moral 
consideration that our belief that John Hope Franklin is a staﬀ member would be unfair to 
John Hope Franklin  for  reasons  previously  discussed,  makes  the  cases  high-stakes  cases. 
Moral  encroachment,  then,  understood as  the  thesis  that  morally  risky  beliefs  raise  the 
threshold for (or “encroach” upon)  justification makes sense of the intuitive thought that 
racist beliefs require more evidence and more justification than other beliefs. 
What distinguishes this approach from others considered so far is that it provides an 
alternative route to simply throwing our hands up in the air and proclaiming these cases to 
be  dilemmas.  It  also  avoids  the  problems  associated  with  moral  and  epistemic  priority, 
because on this view neither consideration takes priority; rather, both considerations work 
together  to  determine  what  you  should  believe  and  what  you  should  do.  The  moral 
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considerations raise the epistemic standards in these high-stakes cases. We can preserve the 
thought  that  the  facts  don’t  care  about  your  (or  other  people’s)  feelings  while  also 
recognizing that whether or not you are justified in believing on the basis of the evidence 
available to you is a question that is sensitive to non-factual or non-evidential considerations. 
Whether you have enough evidence to believe varies according to the stakes. 
Returning to the courtroom, we see this intuitive thought in play. Criminal cases are 
high-stakes cases; that is why the standard the evidence must meet is higher than in civil 
cases.  In  a  criminal  case  you  must  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant 
committed the crime; in a civil case the standard is considerably lower. Similarly, if you are 
going to believe that someone is a valet on the basis of their skin color, although that might 
give you a lot of evidence, it’s not enough evidence to make the belief justified. Given the high 
moral stakes, you must look for more evidence. See also Siegel (this volume).
Despite my preference for moral encroachment, this view also faces some challenges. 
First, moral encroachment risks compounding and contributing to the unfairness that John 
Hope  Franklin,  and  other  folks  who  are  constantly  mistaken  for  staﬀ  or  “the  help,” 
experience. Moral encroachment recommends that, when it comes to beliefs about black 
men and other non-dominantly situated groups, the epistemic situations are high stakes. As a 
result,  when it  comes  to  forming  beliefs  about  dominantly  situated folks,  our  epistemic 
situations will be more free and less burdensome because we won’t constantly be walking on 
epistemic eggshells.  This, however, also seems unfair. To answer this challenge, I think it’s a 
mistake to say that moral considerations only make it harder to believe; sometimes moral 
considerations might also make it easier to believe. For example, if we live in a world in which 
women’s testimony, and the testimony of victims of sexual assault more generally (regardless 
of the gender or sex of the victim), is routinely discounted, then perhaps we have a moral 
burden to lower our evidential standards for believing the victim (see Fricker 2007 for more 
on these forms of testimonial injustice). However, if we go this route, this opens us up to 
more challenges: how do we determine when moral considerations cause the threshold to go 
up  and  when  moral  considerations  cause  the  threshold  to  go  down?  Also,  we  shouldn’t 
downplay the worry that, if we allow considerations of morality and knowledge to encroach 
upon each other, our standards of justification might be easily manipulated. 
Related  to  this  epistemic  eggshell  worry  is  a  worry  about  the  demandingness  of 
moral  encroachment.  If  one will  fail  to be justified in virtue of  failing to appreciate the 
burden and risks that they impose on another, then almost all beliefs about other people—
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especially any belief about a person on the basis of their race or another protected class—are 
going to be high stakes. Moral encroachment, it seems then, is demanding. It requires moral 
agents to be fairly sophisticated in recognizing when they should occupy this kind of moral 
standpoint. However, as I’ve suggested elsewhere (Basu Forthcoming), the moral encroacher 
should just bite this bullet. Morality is demanding. It should not be surprising then that a 
moral constraint on our epistemic practices would be similarly demanding. In our everyday 
lives and our day-to-day beliefs, we may often fall short of the moral and epistemic ideal. The 
ideal, however, exists as a standard we ought to strive to meet nonetheless. Similarly, consider 
Cliﬀord’s  response to the objector who says that they’re a busy man and that they can’t 
possibly be expected to take the time and eﬀort to make sure they never ever believe on the 
basis  of  insuﬃcient  evidence.  To  such  a  character,  Cliﬀord  simply  oﬀers  the  following 
rebuke, “then he should have no time to believe.”
This list of objections is not exhaustive (see Gardiner 2018 for more). Nonetheless, I 
sincerely  believe that  moral  encroachment oﬀers  the best  analysis  of  the cases  in which 
fairness and accuracy seem to conflict. To then finally answer the question contained in the 
title, fairness does not require inaccuracy. Nor does our desire for accurate beliefs require 
that we disregard considerations of fairness. Community’s Pierce Hawthorne isn’t a righteous 
jerk who at least is aiming for accurate beliefs when he accuses Troy of stealing Annie’s pen 
because Troy (a young black man) is the statistically likeliest candidate. Pierce Hawthorne 
isn’t exhibiting any epistemic virtues. He’s just being a jerk.
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